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Dialectic is one of those ancient sciences that have been most misunderstood in the metaphysics of the moderns, as well as by popular philosophy in general, ancient and modern alike.
-Hegel 1 T he aim of this chapter is the following: to set the contours of Slavoj Žižek's understanding of dialectical materialism, with the focus on his latest work. In order to do so, a few preliminary remarks should be established.
The remarks concern the subtitles qua concepts that are included in Žižek's last two big books: Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism and Absolute Recoil: Towards a New Foundation of Dialectical Materialism. As Žižek himself put it in the latter, we should understand these books as an exercise in and not on dialectical materialism; that is to say, dialectical materialism is not the topic, but it is practiced in the book(s) itself. In traditional understanding, dialectic is conceived of either as a method or as a system. However, this is not the case with Žižek. For him, putting dialectical materialism to work is interpenetrated with it as an object. In other words, there is no distinction between the method and an object: they are mediated. This means that the method appears within what it studies as an object and the object is nothing other than a "distortion," a particular logic which spells out the method. In doing so, Žižek's solution is the elevation of Hegel's speculative notion of absolute recoil into a universal principle of ontological import. Drawing on traditions that are already known, he maintains that dialectical materialism is the only "true philosophical inheritor of what Hegel designates as the speculative attitude of the thought towards objectivity." This is the core of Žižek's argument: dialectical materialism concerns the most radical attempt to ground subjectivity qua subjectivity into objectivity-not merely to find the hidden "objective reality" of thought, but he uses Lacan and Hegel to ground subjectivity in its negative character in the real. But, what does it mean to go on one's ground?
Dialectical Framework
Žižek's name for the dialectic is absolute recoil. Hegel uses this term twice in his Science of Logic, through which he philosophizes about "the speculative coincidence of opposites in the movement by which a thing emerges out of its own loss."
2 In a longer paragraph from Logic, Hegel writes that the ground is itself one of the reflected determinations of essence; but it is the last of them, or rather the meaning of this determination is merely that it is a sublated determination. The reflected determination, in falling to the ground, acquires its true meaning, namely, to be within itself the absolute recoil upon itself, that is to say, the positedness that belongs to essence is only a sublated positedness, and conversely, only self-sublating positedness is the positedness of essence. Essence, in determining itself as ground, is determined as the nondetermined; its determining is only the sublating of its being determined. Essence, in being determined thus as self-sublating, has not proceeded from another, but is, in its negativity, self-identical essence.
3
What Hegel is saying is that in a logic of reflection, there is nothing before the loss; that is to say that "becoming is essence, its reflective movement, is the movement of nothing to nothing, and so back to itself." 4 Žižek's example to illustrate this is the case of Malcolm X, who adopted the X as his surname. By doing so, Malcolm X didn't struggle to return to the old African roots, but X stands for the exact possibility that slavery creates: by losing African roots forever, the X opens up to create a new identity. For Hegel, the becoming as transition sublates itself in becoming, which means that when something (say, origin, cultural, or national roots, etc.) is negated, and through the very act of negation, the thing is posited backwards. Hegel distinguishes between three forms of absolute reflection: positioning reflection, external reflection, and determining reflection. 5 This triad is the fundamental dialectic matrix of Hegel's philosophy. A reference to religion can serve as a good example. Let us take the pagan universe as the positioning reflection, whose inner harmony is "cut off " or
